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We examine how two types of slack resources relevant to knowledge employees—human 
resource slack and financial slack at the R&D functional level—influence the rent-generating 
potential of firm-specific knowledge resources. According to the resource- and knowledge-based 
views of the firm, firm-specific knowledge resources are critical for generating economic rents 
for a firm. However, without motivated knowledge employees investing in the corresponding 
specialized human capital in the process of absorbing and deploying firm-specific knowledge 
resources, the resource potential for rent generation would be greatly discounted. We argue that 
human resource slack among knowledge employees and financial slack available for R&D 
activities affect the rent-generating potential of firm-specific knowledge resources by influenc-
ing knowledge employees’ incentives to invest in specialized human capital. In particular, while 
financial slack facilitates rent generation of firm-specific knowledge resources by increasing 
employee incentives to invest in specialized human capital, human resource slack hinders it by 
reducing such incentives. Empirical results based on longitudinal R&D employment data, U.S. 
patent data, and Compustat support these arguments.
Keywords: firm-specific knowledge resources; financial slack; human resource slack; 
employee incentives; specialized human capital investments; firm performance
484519JOMXXX10.1177/0149206313484519JOuRNAl OF MANAGeMeNTWang et al. / 
Firm-Specific Knowledge
2013
Acknowledgments: This article was accepted under the editorship of Deborah E. Rupp. The authors would like to 
acknowledge the editor and two anonymous reviewers, as well as seminar participants at Singapore Management 
University, Hong Kong University, Beijing Guanghua School of Management, and Australian Graduate School of 
Management (Sydney), for their constructive comments.
Corresponding author: Guoguang Wan, Department of Management, School of Business, Hong Kong University of 
Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong.
E-mail: wanguoguang@ust.hk
Published in Journal of Management, 2016 February, Volume 42, Issue 2, Pages 500-523
http://doi.org/10.1177/0149206313484519
Wang et al. / Firm-Specific Knowledge   501
484519JOMXXX10.1177/0149206313484519JOuRNAl OF MANAGeMeNTWang et al. / 
Firm-Specific Knowledge
2013
A critical argument of the resource-based view of the firm is that resources that are valu-
able, rare, and difficult to imitate and substitute are the sources of gaining and sustaining 
economic rents (Barney, 1991). Firm-specific rather than general knowledge resources 
would most likely meet these criteria, and they are considered as among the most important 
sources of economic rents (Coff, 1997; Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992). However, rent 
generation from firm-specific knowledge resources is far from being automatic. The process 
of absorbing and deploying those resources usually requires knowledge employees to make 
complementary investments in human capital specialized to the knowledge resources.
In this study, we examined how slack resources at the R&D function level affect the rent-
generating potential of firm-specific knowledge through their influence on the incentives of 
knowledge employees to invest in specialized human capital. Knowledge employees’ incen-
tives may be influenced by two risks that they potentially face—the risk of being held up by 
the firm and the risk of firm financial distress, which is often associated with underinvest-
ment in R&D. As specialized human capital investments are more valuable in a particular 
firm than in any other company settings, such investments are subject to opportunistic 
behavior or holdup by the firm (Becker, 1975; Williamson, 1985). In addition, knowledge 
employees are likely to take into account the risk of their firm’s financial distress in making 
investment decisions. When the financial prospects of a firm are unpromising, there is a 
higher likelihood of substantial cut of R&D investments. Knowledge employees are then 
more concerned about losing the value of their investments, and moreover the firm might 
renege on its promised rewards, a key lever for achieving goal alignment between the firm 
and its employees (Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007; Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995; Hart & 
Moore, 1990; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). Consequently, employees come to be concerned 
about the possibility to appropriate rents from their specialized human capital investments.
The willingness of a firm’s knowledge employees to invest in specialized human capital 
necessary in absorbing and exploiting firm-specific knowledge resources will be negatively 
affected by these two risks. When these risks are high, the potential economic rents and 
competitive advantage brought by firm-specific knowledge resources may be substantially 
discounted due to the employees’ reluctance to make investments in specialized human 
capital. A more comprehensive theory of economic rents and competitive advantage, there-
fore, should take into account the risks knowledge employees face and their incentives to 
invest in developing specialized human capital.
Building on previous studies of organizational slack (Mishina, Pollock, & Porac, 2004; 
Singh, 1986; Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & Voss, 2008), we propose that levels of slack resources 
in the R&D functional level help to address the risks the knowledge employees face, and 
thus are significantly related to their incentives to invest in specialized human capital. In 
particular, we examined human resource slack among knowledge employees and financial 
slack available to these employees. Because of their different characteristics (Mishina et al., 
2004; Voss et al., 2008) and differential effects on the two risks that knowledge employees 
face, they are expected to have different influences on knowledge employees’ incentives to 
invest in specialized human capital. While human resource slack is expected to negatively 
moderate the relationship between firm-specific knowledge resources and financial perfor-
mance, financial slack is expected to have a positive moderating effect on this relationship. 
Figure 1 summarizes the main arguments of this study.
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Firm-Specific Knowledge Resources and Employee Specialized Human 
Capital Investments
Firm-Specific Knowledge Resources and Superior Financial Performance
The resource-based view of the firm considers the firm as a bundle of heterogeneous 
tangible and intangible resources (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991). Among the 
various resources examined, knowledge is considered to be one of the most important 
resources for generating economic rents (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Firm knowl-
edge can be classified according to the degree to which it is specific to a firm’s unique fea-
tures. Firm-specific knowledge is closely related to a firm’s current knowledge base highly 
embedded in its specific business setting (Helfat, 1994; Pavitt, 1991). Such knowledge will 
be more useful within the focal firm but less applicable and valuable in other firms. General 
knowledge, by contrast, is less specialized to a particular firm setting and thus more easily 
tradable in the market. Firms differ in the specificity of their knowledge resources, in part 
because they adopt different knowledge management strategies (Wang, He, & Mahoney, 
2009).
These interfirm differences in knowledge accumulation and utilization strategies, and the 
resulting differences in the degree of firm specificity of knowledge resources, have impor-
tant implications for firms’ competitive positions and economic performance. First, since 
firm-specific knowledge is not easily tradable outside the firm, it is likely to be rare and less 
subject to rival imitation (Helfat, 1994; Peteraf, 1993). Moreover, rival firms seeking to 
appropriate value through imitating the focal firm’s firm-specific knowledge must gain 
access to the knowledge itself as well as the organizational routines and complementary 
resources supporting its deployment. Gaining access to the latter, however, is extremely dif-
ficult due to the complexities in knowledge management. The resource-based view thus 
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suggests that accumulating and deploying firm-specific knowledge provides firms with 
greater potential for gaining sustainable competitive advantage and economic rents (Barney, 
1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Helfat, 1994).
On the other hand, relative to general knowledge, firm-specific knowledge is some-
times associated with a greater risk. The ultimate value of firm-specific knowledge is 
determined in part by the degree to which it contributes to the firm’s adaptation to envi-
ronment change (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2003; Priem & Butler, 2001). The same firm 
specificity that makes it difficult for rivals to imitate may also be a source of core 
rigidities, which make it difficult for the firm to adapt to changing environment (Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). In contrast, although general knowledge is not a source of 
competitive advantage for firms, it helps firms to adapt to environment change and 
increases firms’ chance of survival.
Therefore, although firm-specific knowledge has a greater rent-generating potential, the 
increased risk associated with accumulating such knowledge makes it unclear whether firm-
specific knowledge will be always related to greater financial performance. However, it is 
often considered to be necessary for firms to develop and deploy firm-specific knowledge to 
gain and sustain competitive advantage (Helfat, 1994; Wang et al., 2009).
Employee Incentives to Specialize and the Rent-Generating Potential of Firm-
Specific Knowledge
Knowledge employees—employees with high information content in their work inputs 
and outputs (Davis, Rosann, Michael, & William, 1993)—play an important role in affecting 
the capacity of the organization to perform and to obtain results (Drucker, 1999). Although 
firm-specific knowledge resources have the potential to generate economic rents for firms, 
knowledge employees have to make complementary investments to develop human capital 
to absorb and deploy those firm-specific knowledge resources (Rajan & Zingales, 2001; 
Wang et al., 2009). Without such complementary investments, the potential for firm-specific 
knowledge to achieve superior economic performance can be very much discounted. To bet-
ter understand the relationship between firm-specific knowledge and employee human capi-
tal, it is helpful to consider Wright, Dunford, and Snell’s (2001) typology of intellectual 
capital, which was classified into three categories: human, social, and organizational capital. 
According to this typology, our concepts of firm-specific knowledge and employee human 
capital here can be regarded as two different constructs representing organizational and 
human capital, respectively. In particular, in the context of this article, firm-specific knowl-
edge refers to knowledge uniquely possessed by a firm. On the other hand, employee spe-
cialized human capital indicates the employee’s own expertise, knowledge, and skills 
required to utilize firm-specific knowledge resources. Thus, the rent-generating potential of 
firm-specific knowledge as a typical element of organizational capital will be seriously dis-
counted without knowledge employees’ specialized human capital.
A key problem faced by many firms in encouraging knowledge employees to make spe-
cialized investments is that the employees may be concerned about losing the value of their 
specialized human capital after irreversible investments have been made. Such concerns 
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could not be assuaged by writing a comprehensive compensation contract (Hart, 1995). 
Much research in organizational economics has suggested that the extent to which employ-
ees willingly make investments ex ante depends largely on their ability to appropriate returns 
on such investments ex post (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995; Hart & Moore, 1990; 
Rajan & Zingales, 1998, 2001). The expected ex post appropriation of returns on their spe-
cialized investments will thus be a critical consideration of the employees when deciding 
whether and to what extent such investments should be made (Helfat, 1994). Therefore, it is 
necessary to understand the conditions where employees are concerned about ex post appro-
priation of returns.
Drawing from human capital theory (Becker, 1975), transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985), and economics- and psychology-based motivation theories 
(Gibbons, 1998; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Huselid, 1995; Kerr, 1975), we argue that 
two risks that may influence ex post return appropriation by employees determine knowl-
edge employees’ ex ante incentives to make specialized human capital investments and thus 
the rent-generating potential of firm-specific knowledge resources. The first risk stems from 
the potential threat of firm holdup. Once a knowledge employee makes investments in spe-
cialized human capital, the firm may be able to appropriate the quasi rents associated with 
the investments (Becker, 1975; Williamson, 1985). Thus, a critical concern of knowledge 
employees for investing in specialized human capital is their vulnerability to the threat of 
holdup by the firm, possibly in the form of reduced salary, limited promotion, and even the 
threat of layoff. Although the firm also relies on its knowledge employees with specialized 
investments (Rajan & Zingales, 2001), it is generally the case that employees are in a more 
disadvantaged bargaining position and thus are more vulnerable to the firm’s opportunistic 
behavior. Knowledge employees’ concerns about holdup may be mitigated if the firm bears 
some of the cost of the investment, through paying for firm-specific training, for example. 
However, the skills and knowledge developed from specialized investments are largely tacit 
and hard to observe and therefore difficult to obtain only through formal training programs. 
employees’ own efforts are likely to still play an important role, so their concerns about firm 
holdup have to be alleviated. Knowledge employees who feel the holdup risk will justifiably 
be less willing to make specialized human capital investments.
A second risk faced by knowledge employees is the possibility of a firm’s financial dis-
tress. Particularly, when a firm is in financial distress, which is often associated with a sig-
nificant reduction in long-term investment such as R&D (Thurow, 1993), it is likely that the 
knowledge employees will cast serious doubt on whether or not they will be appropriately 
rewarded for their investments (Huselid, 1995; Kerr, 1975). In general, uncertainty in finan-
cial reward will particularly loom larger to employees who make specialized human capital 
investments, since such investments are less valuable in a different setting (Becker, 1975; 
Williamson, 1985). In addition, financial distress is often associated with a substantial cut of 
R&D investment, which further exacerbates employee concerns. Anticipating that a firm is 
incapable of committing to R&D investments and paying due rewards to knowledge creation 
efforts, knowledge employees’ motivations to exert efforts will be reduced in the first place 
(Brief & Aldag, 1975; Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007). Thus, when there is a high risk of financial 
distress, especially when it is manifested in the firm’s underinvestment in R&D, the firm’s 
knowledge employees may underinvest in specialized human capital.
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In sum, the rent-generating potential of firm-specific knowledge resources depends on the 
two risks that knowledge employees face, which influence their incentives to invest in spe-
cialized human capital. We argue below that two types of slack resources in the R&D func-
tional level—human resource slack and financial slack—will address those risks, affecting 
the rent-generating potential of firm-specific knowledge resources as a result. Knowledge 
employees become less inclined to make specialized human capital investments with the 
increase in human resource slack among knowledge employees because they face a greater 
risk of holdup. In contrast, financial slack available for R&D activities will lead knowledge 
employees to develop positive expectation of a favorable environment for R&D function and 
due reward for their investments, which is likely to contribute to their incentives for special-
ized human capital investments.
Needless to say, human resource slack and financial slack are not the only factors influ-
encing the two types of risks and an employee’s incentive to invest in specialized human 
capital. For example, Wang and her colleagues (2009) found empirical support for the roles 
of employee stock ownership and firm–employee relations as firm governance mechanisms 
in facilitating employees’ specialized human capital investments. Gottschalg and Zollo 
(2007) similarly discussed the rent-generating potential of various employee-motivating 
mechanisms including both intrinsic and extrinsic ones. However, to the extent that these 
alternative factors are not always available to firms and their employees, and that even if 
they are available, they are unlikely to completely solve all the employee incentive prob-
lems, there should still be room for other factors, such as the level of firm slack resources, 
to play a role in influencing employee incentives.
The Role of Slack Resources
Organizational slack is defined as a “pool of resources in an organization in excess of the 
minimum necessary to produce a given level of organizational output” (Nohria & Gulati, 
1996: 1246). A certain amount of slack resource, accumulated either unintentionally or 
intentionally, may be useful as an inducement to coalition members (Cyert & March, 1963) 
or employees (Barnard, 1938); as a mechanism to resolve conflicts (Bourgeois & Singh, 
1983; Moch & Pondy, 1977); as a technical buffer against environmental turbulence 
(Thompson, 1967); and as a facilitator of strategic behavior such as innovation (Hambrick 
& Snow, 1977; Moses, 1992).
One main theme that previous research on organizational slack has focused on is the 
relationship between slack resources and firm performance (Bromiley, 1991; Singh, 1986) 
or innovation (Geiger & Cashen, 2002; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Voss et al., 2008). Different 
theoretical camps present different, sometimes even opposite, predictions about the relation-
ships (George, 2005; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Singh, 1986; Tan & Peng, 2003). Some 
empirical studies have reported a positive, linear relationship between slack resources and 
financial performance (Daniel, lohrke, Fornaciari, & Turner, 2004), while others have 
observed a curvilinear relationship (George, 2005). Some studies have demonstrated a posi-
tive association between slack and innovation (Singh, 1986), but others have found an 
inverted u-shaped relationship between the two (Geiger & Cashen, 2002; Nohria & Gulati, 
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1996). Thus, there appears to be no conclusive evidence about the relationship between slack 
resources and firm performance.
Some scholars (e.g., Mishina et al., 2004; Voss et al., 2008) have recently differentiated 
types of slack, typically human resource slack and financial slack, in an effort to reconcile 
the inconclusive findings of past studies. They have drawn different implications about the 
two types of slack. For instance, Mishina and his colleagues (2004) suggest that while 
human resource slack inhibits product expansion, financial slack facilitates it. Similarly, 
Voss and his colleagues (2008) maintain that human resource slack is positively associated 
with product exploitation, but financial slack is not significantly associated with it. Building 
on this recent line of research as well as arguments based on property rights theory (Hart & 
Moore, 1990; Rajan & Zingales, 1998), we suggest that the two types of slack may affect 
differently the relationship between firm-specific knowledge resources and corporate finan-
cial performance, through their differential influences on knowledge employees’ incentives 
to make specialized human capital investments.
Human Resource Slack and the Rent-Generating Potential of Firm-Specific 
Knowledge
A firm’s human resources are the knowledge, skills, and abilities inherent in individuals 
who make up the organization (Wright, McMahan, & McWilliams, 1994). Human resource 
slack is the amount of human resources in excess of what is required by its operations. 
Human resource slack is largely path-dependent and context-embedded and is tightly tied up 
with current organizational arrangements (love & Nohria, 2005; Voss et al., 2008). Human 
resource slack therefore is characterized by its dependence on current operational conditions 
(Mishina et al., 2004), which increases employees’ vulnerability to a firm’s opportunistic 
behavior.
As this study examines a firm’s firm-specific knowledge resources, and knowledge 
employees’ motivations to specialize their embedded human capital to those resources 
accordingly, we focus on human resource slack among knowledge employees in the 
R&D functional level. In particular, we argue that the level of human resource slack 
among knowledge employees influences the extent to which they are vulnerable to firm 
holdup when making specialized human capital investments. When there is a high level 
of human resource slack among knowledge employees, each employee is likely to face 
greater risk of being transferred to a different job setting, or even being dismissed alto-
gether (Hallock, 1998). Making specialized human capital investments becomes even 
more risky in this situation, as the value of the investment is likely to be significantly 
discounted in a transfer or dismissal (Becker, 1975). Moreover, a high level of human 
resource slack makes collective reaction by knowledge employees to a firm’s opportun-
istic behavior more difficult (Coff, 1999), providing further opportunity for the firm to 
hold up its knowledge employees. Therefore, with an increase in human resource slack 
among knowledge employees, their concern for firm holdup increases, making them less 
willing to invest in specialized human capital and preventing the potential of firm-spe-
cific knowledge from being fully realized.
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In a bilateral bargaining relationship between a firm and its knowledge employees, the 
employees who make specialized human capital investments may become very important or 
even indispensable to the firm (Rajan & Zingales, 1998, 2001). If so, such employees may 
be able to use their indispensability in bargaining for higher compensation, job security, sup-
port for R&D activities, and so on. However, when a greater number of knowledge employ-
ees (more than necessary) make specialized investments (i.e., there is ample human resource 
slack), each employee is less likely to be indispensable to the firm (Glick & Feuer, 1984; 
Rajan & Zingales, 2000; Rock & Wachter, 1999). This line of reasoning is also consistent 
with the replacement cost argument (Coff, 1999). When a firm has ample human resource 
slack among knowledge employees, turnover will involve only limited replacement cost for 
the firm. Any threat to resign will not be as threatening, resulting in lower bargaining power 
on the part of knowledge employees.
As such, high levels of human resource slack among knowledge employees are associated 
with their greater vulnerability to firm holdup and lower bargaining power, which results in 
greater uncertainty in expected ex post appropriation of return from their specialized human 
capital investments. Consequently, knowledge employees will have less incentive for such 
specialized investments. Therefore, we expect that high levels of human resource slack 
among knowledge employees will substantially compromise the potential of firm-specific 
knowledge resources in generating superior economic performance.
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between firm-specific knowledge resources and firm financial per-
formance is negatively moderated by the firm’s human resource slack among knowledge 
employees.
Financial Slack and the Rent-Generating Potential of Firm-Specific Knowledge
Financial slack generally refers to unabsorbed and easy-to-deploy liquid assets, often 
measured by cash flows or marketable securities (Greve, 2003; Miller, 2003; Mishina et al., 
2004; Voss et al., 2008). It is usually considered a crucial buffer for a firm’s activities 
(Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert & March, 1963; Thompson, 1967), especially in a fast-changing 
environment (Meyer, 1982). Thus firms without enough financial slack have a high likeli-
hood of experiencing shortages of funds, retreat from capital investments, or even bank-
ruptcy. Any of these can result in wage cuts and layoffs, even if the firm wants to act in good 
faith (Altman, 1968; Bromiley, 1991; Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988; Jensen, 1986; Kochhar, 
1996; Kochhar & Hitt, 1998).
Similar to the case of human resource slack, this study focuses on financial slack at the 
R&D functional level, which has a direct influence on knowledge employees’ incentives to 
invest in firm-specific human capital. First, a greater amount of financial resources available 
for R&D fosters a favorable atmosphere for knowledge creation (Greve, 2003), which pro-
vides knowledge employees opportunities to conduct diverse R&D activities and make 
human capital investments specific to a firm’s knowledge base.
Second, financial slack available for R&D investment enables knowledge employees to 
expect more generous reward, such as pay for performance and monetary incentives for their 
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specialized human capital investments. Indeed, one of the conventional solutions to the firm-
specific investment problem includes offering attractive monetary reward to employees for 
firm-specific investments (Coff & Kryscynski, 2011). For an offer of attractive reward to 
become a credible commitment, the R&D activities dedicated for knowledge creation have 
to be supported by sound financial budget. So a high level of financial slack available for 
R&D helps knowledge employees to anticipate generous rewards for their R&D activities. 
Accordingly, knowledge employees will be more willing to invest in specialized human 
capital. By contrast, when R&D activities are under financial constraints, contracts with 
knowledge employees and due monetary rewards are less likely to be honored. even worse, 
knowledge employees are more likely to lose their jobs, and with them much of the value of 
their specialized human capital investments.
As such, a high level of financial slack available for knowledge creation promotes interest 
alignment between a firm and its knowledge employees and reduces uncertainty about the 
appropriation of returns on any specialized human capital investments. This encourages 
employees to contribute more willingly to transforming firm-specific knowledge resources 
into superior financial performance.
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between firm-specific knowledge resources and firm financial per-
formance is positively moderated by the firm’s financial slack available for knowledge creation.
Method
Data and Sample
Our sample involved data from three sources: R&D employment survey data, National 
Bureau of economic Research (NBeR) patent data, and Standard & Poor’s Compustat 
series. The R&D employment survey data were collected by the u.S. Bureau of the Census 
from 1997 to 2005, with an aim to investigate full-time equivalent R&D scientists and engi-
neers in u.S. companies with heavy investments in R&D. As the detailed R&D employment 
data were available only for the top 100 R&D firms in each year, we selected our sample 
among these firms. Our focus on R&D- or knowledge-intensive firms is particularly suitable 
for this study, as the economic rents of these firms are mainly attributed to their knowledge-
based assets. Meanwhile, there is still sufficient variation in the level of knowledge specific-
ity among the firms. The NBeR patent data files enable us to construct measures of 
firm-specific knowledge resources and some other patent-related variables. Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2001) previously created a data file that contains detailed information about 
over 3 million u.S. patents and almost 24 million citations of patents granted between 1976 
and 2006. Since our unit of analysis is the firm, we aggregated the patents and their citation 
counts to the firm level (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). Data on firms’ financial performance 
and other key variables were collected from Standard & Poor’s Compustat series. After 
merging the three data sets and deleting observations with missing values for our key vari-
ables, we had unbalanced panel data containing 596 firm-year observations between 1997 
and 2005. Moreover, since our calculation of firm-specific knowledge uses patent forward 
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citations, to make sure there are at least three subsequent years of patent citations for each 
firm-year observation, our main sample has 483 firm-year observations between 1997 and 
2003. The larger sample, on the other hand, is used in some robustness tests.
Key Measures
Financial Performance
A commonly used market-based performance measure, Tobin’s q was employed to capture 
each firm’s financial performance. This measure reflects the market’s expectations of the firm’s 
future growth and profit potential (lindenberg & Ross, 1981). Although profits generated by 
firm-specific knowledge resources should ultimately be reflected in firm value, the impact of a 
knowledge resource on a firm’s operations and accounting performance is unlikely to be immedi-
ate. Moreover, it is difficult to know the appropriate time period for analyzing the impact of 
accounting performance measures. In contrast, the stock market is likely to respond much more 
quickly to a firm’s innovation-based knowledge resources, with the share price incorporating 
expectations about their potential value (Deng, lev, & Narin, 1999). A market-based perfor-
mance measure such as Tobin’s q, therefore, is more appropriate for our study. A sophisticated 
Tobin’s q measure requires arbitrary assumptions about depreciation and inflation rates in calcu-
lating assets’ replacement value (lindenberg & Ross, 1981). Following the work of lindenberg 
and Ross, we used a simplified version of Tobin’s q, the market-to-book ratio, which explains 
over 96% of the variance in the more sophisticated measure. The market value numerator was 
taken as the year-end market value of the firm’s common stock plus the book value of its pre-
ferred stock and debt. The denominator was the year-end book value of its total assets. A natural 
logarithmic transformation was applied to Tobin’s q on the assumption that firm resources have 
a multiplicative effect on Tobin’s q (Wang et al., 2009). This approach is consistent with the 
results of previous studies relating a firm’s market value to the economic value of its tangible 
assets and various measures of its intangible assets (Griliches, 1981; Hall, 2000; Hirsch & Seaks, 
1993; Jaffe, 1986). Thus, a logarithmic transformation was considered preferable to linear form 
estimation (Hirsch & Seaks, 1993; Huselid, 1995).
Firm-Specific Knowledge
Firm-specific knowledge often results from firms’ searching for and accumulating new 
knowledge in accordance with their existing knowledge base (Cohen & levinthal, 1989; 
Teece, 1986). Given that patents represent knowledge creation, and that patent citations 
represent knowledge flows, the frequency with which a firm cites its own previous patents 
is indicative of the degree to which it is building on its own knowledge base. The greater 
such internal accumulation is, the more likely that a firm’s new knowledge will be firm 
specific. especially if a firm’s patents are more frequently cited by itself than by other firms 
in the subsequent years, it indicates that the knowledge underlying these patents has a greater 
value within the firm than in other firms; thus the knowledge accumulated by this firm is 
relatively more firm specific.
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Following Wang and Chen (2010), we construct two measures of firm-specific knowl-
edge using forward patent citations. The first is the extent to which a focal firm’s patents in 
a certain year is cited by itself vis-à-vis by other firms in the 3 years that follow, designed to 
capture the degree of firm specificity in a firm’s knowledge base. It is calculated by dividing 
the number of forward self-citations by the total number of forward citations received by all 
firms. The second is the number of self-citations received, designed to capture the overall 
level of firm-specific knowledge resources. This is calculated simply by counting forward 
self-citations of a focal firm’s patents within 3 subsequent years scaled by firm size (i.e., 
total assets). The specific formulas are as follows:
Firm-Specific Knowledge (degree) = Number of Forward Citations Subsequently received  
by the Focal Firm / Number of Total Citations Subsequently received
Firm-Specific Knowledge (level) = Number of Forward Citations Subsequently received  
by the Focal Firm (adjusted by Firm Size)
Human Resource Slack
While human resource slack was typically measured in previous studies as organizational-
level human resources relative to a reference level, since our focus in this study is on knowledge 
employees, it is more appropriate for us to measure human resource slack among knowledge 
employees in the R&D functional department. However, there is no readily available information 
about the reference level of R&D human resources or the ideal number of knowledge employees 
for each firm. Some previous work (e.g., Welbourne, Neck, & Meyer, 1999) used industry-level 
average human resources as the reference level by aggregating firm-level data. However, as firms 
within an industry are heterogeneous and so are their desired levels of human resources, an indus-
try average may not be a proper reference level for each particular firm in that industry. Moreover, 
our R&D employment data do not cover all firms in each industry and thus are not able to provide 
industry-level information for R&D human resources.
Therefore, we depart from previous studies to measure human resource slack based on a 
predicted value approach (Shen, Tang, & Chen, in press). In particular, we estimate each 
firm’s desired level of R&D human resources by regressing the actual level of its full time 
R&D scientists and engineers against some key firm, industry, and year attributes that are 
thought to affect a firm’s need for knowledge employees. In particular, in the model predict-
ing the appropriate reference level of R&D human resources, we included variables such as 
firm size, firm age, the level of firm-specific knowledge, as well as some industry character-
istics. Previous literature suggested that industry environment, organizational size, organiza-
tional age, and characteristics of technology in the production process influence the level of 
firm low discretion slack such as skilled labor (March & Simon, 1958; Sharfman, Wolf, 
Chase, & Tansik, 1988). In addition, industry-level employment was included in the estima-
tion. As this variable has been used as the reference level of a firm’s human resources in 
some calculations of human resource slack (e.g., Welbourne et al., 1999), it may have an 
influence on the reference level of R&D human resources as well. Industry and year dum-
mies were also included as controls.
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The predicted level of R&D human resources was then used as a proxy of the reference 
level for a firm as its need of R&D human resources allowing for unique firm and industry 
features. Human resource slack among knowledge employees was then computed as the dif-
ference between the actual and the predicted level of R&D human resources. We applied a 
common procedure by taking the natural logarithm of the number of R&D employees, given 
the positive skewness in this variable.
Financial Slack
Following Daniel et al.’s (2004) conceptualization of R&D expenses as recoverable 
slack, we measure financial slack available for R&D activities and knowledge creation by 
using R&D expenses over total assets. Compared to other measures of financial slack (e.g., 
current ratio), the measure based on R&D expenses is more appropriate for our study focus-
ing on financial slack at the R&D functional level. Knowledge employees should be more 
concerned about financial slack available for R&D activities and knowledge creation, which 
can be best captured by a firm’s R&D expenses. Moreover, as large firms are usually associ-
ated with higher level of R&D expenses (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Rothwell, 1984), 
we scale R&D expenses by firm size as measured by total assets.
Control Variables
Besides the above key variables, we also included a few variables as controls. First, we 
control for firm size, proxied by the natural logarithm of each firm’s total assets, given the 
evident positive skewness in this variable. Firm age, calculated as the natural logarithm of 
years since each firm’s establishment, was also included in the regressions. Prior perfor-
mance based on an accounting measure, ROA, was included in the equations to control for 
the effect of previous performance on current performance. As a firm’s capital structure is 
generally thought to have an influence on its financial performance, we also control for 
financial leverage, measured as total debt over total assets. In addition, variations across 
industries were controlled at the four-digit SIC level. last, year dummies were also included 
in all equations.
Estimation Method
Our analysis requires taking into consideration the possibility that slack resources 
might be endogenously determined, to the extent that managers have some discretion in 
altering the level of slack. It is then possible that the factors affecting the level of finan-
cial slack are correlated with financial performance. Ordinary least squares (OlS) 
regression of financial performance against organizational slack would then lead to 
biased estimates. To address this endogeneity issue associated with financial slack, we 
used an econometric approach involving simultaneous equations estimated using the 
two-stage least squares (2SlS) method (Greene, 1997). The 2SlS estimation in this 
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study had two stages. In the first stage, financial slack served as the dependent variable. 
It was regressed against variables that are thought to affect a firm’s allocation of finan-
cial resources to its R&D investment. The fitted value of financial slack was thus cre-
ated and used in the second-stage financial performance regressions to reduce any biases 
caused by endogeneity. Please note that for our human resource slack variable, since we 
have applied the predicted value approach, which helps partial out the endogenously 
determined variance of the level of R&D human resources, we do not need to separately 
include another first-stage equation.
The first variable included in the first-stage equation was the level of firm-specific knowl-
edge. If R&D investment influences the extent to which a firm can benefit from its firm-
specific knowledge resources, firms with high levels of firm-specific knowledge resources 
should have a greater incentive to modify their levels of R&D investment to maximize the 
benefit from their knowledge resources. If so, firm-specific knowledge resources should 
correlate with the level of financial slack. Also included in the first-stage equation are firm 
size and age because they are often thought to affect the level of organizational resources 
and slack (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Daniel et al., 2004; March & Simon, 1958; 
Sharfman et al., 1988; Singh, 1986; Voss et al., 2008). Industry and year dummies were also 
included to account for the differences across these dimensions.
Other variables related to a firm’s financial resources were also included in the first-
stage equation for financial slack. Past performance, financial leverage, and current 
ratio were important factors influencing a firm’s R&D expenses (Greve, 2003). In addi-
tion, since firms with intensive knowledge production face greater operational risks 
resulting from a large scale of patenting intensity, they are more likely to maintain 
higher levels of financial slack (Damanpour, 1987; Sharfman et al., 1988). Thus, cita-
tion-weighted patent intensity was added. Finally, industry-level financial slack was 
used as an instrument. Industry-level financial slack satisfies the requirements for being 
an instrumental variable since the industry average slack is expected to affect firm 
financial slack through the pressures of isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
However, it is unlikely that the level of slack in other firms in the same industry has a 
direct impact on a focal firm’s subsequent financial performance. In the second stage, 
financial performance was regressed against the newly estimated slack variables, firm-
specific knowledge resources, and their interactions. We measured financial perfor-
mance one year after the other independent variable to avoid the possibility of reverse 
causality. The following equation was used to test the hypotheses in the second stage,
log( )q FSK HRSlack FSK HRSlack
FISlack
t t t t t
t
+ = + + + ×
+ +
1 0 1 2 3
4
β β β β
β β λ ε5FSK FISlack Xt t t t× + +
where log(qt+1) is the log-transformed Tobin’s q, Xt is a set of control variables that are 
expected to influence financial performance, and FSKt is a continuous variable reflecting the 
level of firm-specific knowledge. HRSlackt and FISlackt refer to human resource slack and 
financial slack, respectively. We mean-centered firm-specific knowledge and slack variables 
and added their interaction terms to test our hypotheses.
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Results
Descriptive Statistics and Hypothesis Testing
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for the major variables. Consistent 
with expectations, the correlations between both measures of firm-specific knowledge and 
financial performance are positive. There is a positive correlation between financial slack 
and financial performance, whereas the correlation between human resource slack and finan-
cial performance is not significant. Significant intercorrelations are also observed among 
some other variables such as firm size, firm age, prior performance, and financial leverage. 
Hence, we investigate whether there is a potential multicollinearity problem by computing 
variance inflation factors (VIFs). The maximum VIF obtained in any of the models was less 
than 4, while the mean VIF was around 2.1; these values are substantially below the rule-of-
thumb cutoff of 10 for regression models (Ryan, 1997). Therefore, multicollinearity is not a 
concern in our results.
In general, the influences of most factors in first-stage equations were significant. The adjusted 
R2 of the human resource slack model was 84% (F = 52.34, p < .001), and the adjusted R2 of the 
financial slack model was 54% (F = 10.62, p < .001). Results of first-stage regression are not 
reported here to save space but are available if requested. Second-stage analysis was then con-
ducted using the slack variables newly estimated by the first-stage regression (in the case of 
human resource slack, the difference between actual level of R&D human resource and the 
estimated value), firm-specific knowledge, and their interaction terms as regressors against finan-
cial performance. Table 2 presents the second-stage regression results with financial performance 
as the dependent variable. Models 1a and 2a report the effects of firm-specific knowledge (both 
degree and level) and the various control variables (firm size, firm age, prior performance, and 
financial leverage) on financial performance.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 1.  Financial performance: 
log(Tobin’s q)
–0.63 0.29  
 2.  Firm-specific 
knowledge (degree)
0.21 0.13 .03  
 3.  Firm-specific 
knowledge (level)
0.02 0.03 .16* .29*  
 4. Human resource slack 0.01 0.24 –.04 –.10* –.02  
 5. Financial slack 0.09 0.06 .28* .02 .16* –.11*  
 6. Firm size 10.03 0.84 –.32* –.11* –.31* .18* –.73*  
 7. Firm age 29.58 17.94 .07 .19* –.05 .10* –.23* .14*  
 8. Prior performance 0.15 0.10 .27* .16* –.09* .15* –.09* –.06 .25*  
 9. Financial leverage 0.14 0.10 –.18* .00 .02 –.13* –.27* .15* .20* –.29*  
10. Current ratio 1.65 0.73 .55* .02 .12* –.06 .44* –.36* –.18* .06 –.34*  
11. Patent number 4.90 1.52 –.14* –.13* .32* .12* –.19* .24* .00 –.22* .02 –.07  
12.  Industry financial slack 0.31 2.44 –.05 .01 –.02 –.05 –.02 .01 .06 –.00 .01 .03 –.03  
13. Industry employment 2.16 1.43 –.45* –.05 –.17* .05 –.47* .52* .02 –.24* .15* –.48* .12* –.02
*p < .05.
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Models 1b, 2b, 1c, and 2c add the interaction terms between the two slack variables and 
firm-specific knowledge, respectively. Models 1b and 2b suggest that human resource slack 
has a negative main effect on the firm’s financial performance. More important, the moder-
ating effects of human resource slack on the relationship between both measures of firm-
specific knowledge and financial performance are negative and significant. These findings 
strongly support Hypothesis 1.
On the other hand, financial slack shows a strong main effect on financial performance 
and its interaction with firm-specific knowledge (measured both as a level and degree) is 
positive and significant (Models 1c and 2c). Hypothesis 2, which predicts a positive moder-
ating effect of financial slack, is also supported.
To better interpret these results, the interaction effects were plotted in Figure 2 using 
the procedure proposed by Aiken and West (1991) based on Models 1b and 1c, which 
show consistently significant moderating effects for both types of slack resources when 
firm-specific knowledge is measured as a degree. The figures show that firm specificity 
Figure 2
The Moderating Effects of Slack Resources
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in a firm’s knowledge resources has a positive effect on the firm’s financial performance 
when the firm has a low level of human resource slack or a high level of financial slack. 
However, the effect becomes negative when a firm has a high level of human resource 
slack or a low level of financial slack. This suggests that firm-specific knowledge may 
damage financial performance when there is too much human resource slack or insuf-
ficient financial slack.
Robustness Checks
To ensure that our results are not subject to biases in the specific measures and methods 
that this study used, we conducted a few robustness checks. First, as the R&D and patenting 
strategies might be very different between manufacturing and service firms, we excluded 
firms from service industries and conducted the same sets of analyses with a sample of 
manufacturing firms only (428 firm-year observations). We found quite consistent results 
that support both of our hypotheses.
Second, to make sure that the patents for each firm-year observation have at least 3-year 
forward citations, we used observations between 1997 and 2003 (our patents citations data 
cover until 2006) for our main analyses. To ensure the results are robust, we have tried alter-
native year cutoff points, including 2002 and 2004, which allow each firm-year patents to 
have at least 4 and 2 years forward citations, respectively. In addition, we have done some 
robustness tests with alternative measures of firm-specific knowledge based on backward 
citations. All the results using these alternative measures are quite consistent with the main 
results.
Third, given that prior studies (e.g., Cheng & Kesner, 1997; Mishina et al., 2004) fre-
quently used the current ratio, that is, current assets divided by current liabilities, as the 
measure of financial slack, we also conducted the analyses using current ratio as an alterna-
tive measure of financial slack. The results are consistent with those using our measure 
based on R&D intensity. This again supports Hypothesis 2.
Finally, as an alternative to a 2SlS analysis to address the potential endogeneity of slack 
resources, firm-fixed effects model was applied. The results were again largely consistent 
with those using 2SlS models, although the overall level of significance for some of the 
variables was somewhat lower.
Discussion
The resource-based view of the firm emphasizes the role of firm-specific knowledge 
resources in achieving superior economic performance (Barney, 1991; Coff, 1997; Grant, 
1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992). However, without the employee investments in specialized 
human capital needed to absorb and deploy firm-specific knowledge resources, the potential 
of those resources to generate superior performance would be substantially compromised. 
Thus in analyzing a firm’s competitive advantage it is important to consider factors that may 
influence employees’ incentives to make specialized human capital investments. This study 
examines the roles of two types of slack resources in affecting employee investments. 
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Financial slack available for R&D investments was found to enable a firm to achieve a bet-
ter economic performance from its firm-specific knowledge resources by enhancing 
employee incentives to make specialized human capital investments. In contrast, our find-
ings show that human resource slack among knowledge employees has the opposite effect.
This study contributes to the resource-based view of the firm in several ways. First, it 
helps delimit its applicability by demonstrating contingencies that either enhance or depreci-
ate the value of firm-specific knowledge resources. The traditional resource-based view of 
the firm has focused mainly on a firm’s core resources and the criteria making these 
resources sources of competitive advantage. What has often been overlooked is the role of 
employee incentives in the process of absorbing and deploying the core resources that con-
tribute to superior financial performance and competitive advantage. In line with some 
recent research (Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007; Wang & Barney, 2006; Wang et al., 2009), this 
study suggests that a more complete understanding of firm competitive advantage requires 
considering both core resources and employee incentives to deploy them.
This study also shows the interconnectedness of a firm’s various resources (Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989). Considering a firm as a bundle of heterogeneous resources (Barney, 1991), it 
is possible that the financial implications of one type of resource are affected by the avail-
ability of others. According to our findings, the value of firm-specific knowledge resources 
may be enhanced or impaired by the presence of slack resources. This finding is also in line 
with the literature on resource bundling (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007; Tzabbar, Aharonson, 
Amburgey, & Al-laham, 2008), which emphasizes the complementarity between human 
resources and other organizational resources. Thus, in explaining the effect of a particular 
resource on economic performance, future research on the resource-based view of the firm 
should examine the features of a focal resource (e.g., value, rarity, and inimitability) and its 
interconnectedness with other firm resources.
An additional contribution this article makes to the resource-based view of the firm lit-
erature is about measurement. Despite the demonstrated utility of the resource-based view 
for explaining performance differences among firms, several of the resources that generate 
sustainable advantage are either unobservable or extremely difficult to measure (Godfrey & 
Hill, 1995; Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999). This study represents a step toward overcoming 
this limitation by taking advantage of patent citation data to measure firm specificity in 
innovation-based knowledge resources.
This article also contributes to the organizational slack literature in several aspects. First, 
earlier studies have focused primarily on the direct effects of slack resources on a firm’s 
financial (Bromiley, 1991; Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988; Singh, 1986) or innovative (Nohria 
& Gulati, 1996) performance. Although some recent studies have accounted for some con-
tingent factors that may influence the role of slack resources, they have mostly focused on 
the role of external environment (George, 2005). Voss and colleagues (2008) demonstrated 
that the effect of organizational slack on product strategy is contingent on the level of envi-
ronmental threat a firm faces. Our study has demonstrated that the value of slack resources 
may vary with firm-specific knowledge. It thus complements previous studies by suggesting 
a firm-level contingency factor.
Second, previous studies of organizational slack have focused on its role as a buffer to 
protect the firm’s technical core from environmental turbulence (Daniel et al., 2004; Nohria 
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& Gulati, 1996; Tan & Peng, 2003). Although Bourgeois (1981) and Cyert and March (1963) 
conceptualized organizational slack as an inducement to provide employee incentives, none 
of the empirical studies in this area have paid particular attention to its role as a motivator. 
This study has highlighted its influence on employees’ willingness to deploy firm-specific 
knowledge. So slack resources not only help firms better deal with environmental turbu-
lence, but also have impacts on human factors by influencing employees to invest in special-
ized human capital.
Another contribution of this article has been elucidating the distinction between human 
resource slack and financial slack. A few recent studies (e.g., Mishina et al., 2004; Voss 
et al., 2008) have begun to make such a distinction, and this study has also demonstrated that 
human resource slack and financial slack have opposite influences on employee incentives 
to invest in specialized human capital. It is thus important that future research on organiza-
tional slack continue to differentiate among different types of slack.
Despite these contributions, this study has some limitations that future research might 
fruitfully deal with in refining its key arguments. First, the study takes as given that a firm 
is composed of a bundle of knowledge resources, and we did not investigate how differences 
in firm-specific knowledge among firms arise in the first place. Future research might fill 
this gap by taking a dynamic, process-focused approach to firm-specific knowledge creation 
and the related employee governance issues. For this purpose, future research into the 
dynamics of resource accumulation may need to introduce different theoretical perspectives 
such as the evolutionary theory of the firm.
Second, this study has proposed that managing slack is an important mechanism by which 
firms manage the risks associated with employees’ making specialized human capital invest-
ments, but many other alternative techniques can also be applied to induce employees to 
make such investments. For instance, Wang and her colleagues (2009) have recently dem-
onstrated that employee stock ownership and trusting firm–employee relationships enhance 
employees’ incentives to make specialized human capital investments. employees may also 
be more willing to invest in specialized skills if they are credibly promised future promotion 
opportunities (Carmichael, 1983) or board membership (Roberts & Van den Steen, 2000). 
Due to data limitations, we were not able to directly incorporate these alternative mecha-
nisms into this study. Future research might profitably examine a broader range of govern-
ance or motivating mechanisms and their interactions.
Third, our key arguments suggest that knowledge employees’ incentive to invest in spe-
cialized human capital is a main mechanism through which the two types of slack resources 
affect the rent-generating potential of firm-specific knowledge. By providing supportive 
findings based on a sample of R&D firms and measures of the slack resources operational-
ized in terms of excess human and financial resources at the R&D functional level, we have 
come close to tapping into employee incentives as the underlying mechanism. Nevertheless, 
because we are still not able to directly measure employee incentives, it is difficult to rule 
out other possible alternative mechanisms. Therefore, future research may consider different 
research designs that help more directly capture the underlying mechanism of employee 
incentives, for instance, by applying the survey method.
Patent data provide rich information about the flow of knowledge, but they are limited to 
patented knowledge. This inherent limitation may constrain the interpretation of our results. 
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Moreover, due to the role patent examiners play in citations (Alcacer & Gittelman, 2006), 
patent citation data have been shown to be reflective of many issues rather than just knowl-
edge flow and spillovers (Criscuolo & Verspagen, 2008). Thus, future research might 
attempt to use survey or field data to explore knowledge flows and the degree of firm 
specificity in unpatented knowledge. In addition, some of the citations used in this study 
were made by patent examiners, and some by the inventors themselves. Inferences about 
inventor knowledge using pooled citations may thus involve some bias or overestimated 
significance (Alcacer & Gittelman, 2006). Our data did not allow us to separate these two 
possibilities, but future research might analyze more recent patent data that provide informa-
tion on the sources of patent citations.
The findings of this study suggest that the relationship between levels of slack resources 
and performance is not as simple as previous studies have proposed (Mishina et al., 2004; 
Tan & Peng, 2003; Voss et al., 2008), and this has important implications for practicing 
managers. Slack can be either a facilitator or an inhibitor for firm-specific knowledge man-
agement. The findings therefore call for careful planning and accumulation of different types 
of slack resources in a firm highly reliant on firm-specific knowledge. In particular, the 
negative moderating effect of human resource slack implies that caution should be exercised 
in designing human resource development programs among R&D employees. Managers 
have to keep in mind that too much is as bad as too little when it comes to human resources. 
Based on a thorough analysis of internal resource endowment and environmental demand, a 
firm should maintain the proper level of skilled R&D human resources. Given the high costs 
of obtaining and maintaining knowledge employees, a careful management of human 
resource slack will also help the firm to conduct efficient cost management in human 
resources.
In summary, the resource-based view of the firm places firm-specific knowledge among 
the most important of a firm’s resources, and central to the debate about how firms achieve 
sustainable competitive advantage (Coff, 1999; Mahoney, 2005). The willingness of a firm’s 
employees to invest in deploying firm-specific knowledge, in contrast, has received rela-
tively little attention. The role of slacks as complementary resources to potentially rent-
generating firm-specific knowledge through their influences on knowledge employees’ 
incentives to invest in specialized human capital has been highlighted in this study. By doing 
so, this study, along with some other recent studies in related fields (Gottschalg & Zollo, 
2007; Wang & Barney, 2006; Wang et al., 2009), helps advance the resource-based view of 
the firm and develop a more comprehensive theory of the sustainability of competitive 
advantage.
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